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Although the restructuring of the nation’s health care system has in recent
years been near the top of the policy agenda, the introduction of President
Clinton’s and Congress’s counterproposals for health reform has both
increased the intensity of the dialogue and propelled the issue to the top of
the list of national priorities.
Discussion about health care reform encompasses a wide array of issues:
inadequate access, the growing share of national resources devoted to
health care, the incidence of cost-shifting from the uninsured to the insured,
and differences in premium costs between seemingly similarly insured indi-
viduals are but a few of the wide variety of concerns related to the current
system of providing health care. Other concerns stem from the belief that
employer-provided insurance creates distortions in the labor market and,
hence, hinders labor mobility. For example, because employees must gener-
ally obtain new insurance when they switch jobs, those who wish to leave
their current positions may not do so as they face being temporarily unin-
sured, paying a higher price for the same coverage, or losing all or part of
their insurance coverage (due, for example, to a preexisting condition).
Sacrificing job opportunities in order to retain health benefits, or “job-
lock,”  is the  result  of the nonportability  of  health insurance.
Entrepreneurship, too, may be hindered by nonportable health insurance
by altering a worker’s decision to leave a job and start a new firm.
If job-lock is a real phenomenon, the nation pays an economic price in
terms of the costs associated with the misallocation of workers among pro-
ductive opportunities; higher relocation and training costs for those work-
ers who have stayed too long in their jobs; and the loss of innovation,
employment, and competition related to start-up ventures. The question of
the existence of job-lock is, therefore, crucial in determining the optimal
system for the delivery of health insurance.
Recent survey results and anecdotal evidence appear to bolster the argu-
ment that job-lock is a factor in labor market mobility. In order to test the
reliability of these findings, Douglas Holtz-Eakin conducts an empirical
analysis to examine the incidence of job-lock resulting from the nonporta-
bility of health insurance. Using data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) (which include a representative sample of approximately
5,000 families), he compares the percentages of those who have switched
jobs among individuals who do and do not have insurance coverage. His
initial findings are consistent with the theory of job-lock—namely that
those with employer-provided insurance were less likely to change jobs
than those without insurance. The same results were found when control-
ling for gender and marital status.
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does not include the enormous array of information needed to fully
describe an individual’s work environment. (For example, health insurance
may be serving as a proxy for a “good job,” which people are less likely to
relinquish.)  He therefore expands the scope of his analysis to married indi-
viduals and accounts for the presence of spousal insurance in order to bet-
ter gauge the extent of job-lock.
From a direct comparison of those whose spouses do have insurance cover-
age with those whose spouses do not have health benefits, the author con-
cludes that while there is some difference in mobility rates between the two
groups, the rates are not statistically distinguishable from one another. 
However, these results may reflect other factors not accounted for in the
data; for example, being married to a skilled spouse may make it easier for
an individual to change jobs and negate at least some of the effects of job-
lock. Therefore, Holtz-Eakin separates the effect of the spouse’s skills from
that of his or her insurance. After accounting for market skills, Holtz-Eakin
finds that “the extent to which mobility rates are higher for individuals
whose spouses are insured apparently is attributable to the spouses’ market
skills. There is no residual job-lock effect in the data.” Similar results were
obtained when controlling for health status. 
Due to concerns that aggregation may have masked the effects of job-lock
among specific subgroups of the labor force, the data were divided by
income (above and below $8,000 in earnings) and age (older and younger
than 50 years of age); again, no statistically significant incidence of job-lock
was recorded in the data. When the data were separated between those
with more and fewer than 3 years of tenure on the job, it provided some
evidence that concern about the loss of insurance might be important for
individuals who had a relatively short job history with their current
employers. However, the results were at best suggestive. Finally, results on
the effect of job-lock on entrepreneurship indicated little systematic evi-
dence that the presence or lack of health insurance had a negative effect on
an individual’s decision to become self-employed.
Based on these findings, Holtz-Eakin concludes that, despite anecdotal evi-
dence to the contrary, the incidence of job-lock is overstated; therefore,
reform programs proposing the dismantling of the current system of
employer-provided insurance in order to improve labor mobility are mis-
guided. Rather, recommendations should be concerned with improving
access to care and enhancing the efficiency of insurance operations. In addi-
tion, any employer-provided system should be concerned with guaranteeing
the portability of insurance coverage and premium expenses in order to
avoid the possibility of job-lock in the future.
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proposals put forth thus far, reforming the
nation’s health care system is at the top of the
national policy agenda. Nearly all agree that
any plan enacted must stem the tide of rising
costs and improve access to care. Dis-
agreement, though, still exists as to how
broadly access should be expanded and how
much costs should be reduced. How to real-
ize these ends, then, is still a point of con-
tention and is the center of the debate on
health care reform.
Other issues forming the debate over the
“best” reform plan are contentions over
what, if any, other goals should be realized
by reform. One such problem receiving con-
siderable attention has been the phenomenon
referred to as “job-lock”: the reluctance of an
individual to leave his or her current position
for another because of the fear of losing
health benefits or being forced to pay more
for the same level of benefits. If job-lock
takes place, then, workers may not relocate
to jobs in which their productivity is greater,
or, if aspiring entrepreneurs are reluctant to
start their own businesses, the potential inno-
vation, employment, and competition fos-
tered by small business will not be realized.
Either of these events results in the national
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economy operating at less than its full potential. If the incidence of job-
lock—which survey evidence indicates could affect as much as 30 percent
of the labor force—is widespread, reform of the health care system should
include provisions that result in health benefits that are portable from one
job to another. Most, therefore, would advocate policies that move the
health care delivery system away from the current mode of employer-pro-
vided benefits to one that is more national in scope.
The research conducted by Douglas Holtz-Eakin in this issue of the
Institute’s Public Policy Brief details the theoretical reasons for job-lock
and outlines recent survey results used to back up claims of its occurrence.
To test the validity of these surveys, Holtz-Eakin conducts an empirical
analysis of the incidence of job-lock in over 5,000 families. His investiga-




• spousal insurance status
• changes in health status
• income levels
• job tenure
His findings lead him to conclude that “despite concerns to the contrary,
health insurance considerations do not appear to be a pervasive roadblock
to job mobility in the U.S. labor market . . . It is not necessary, then (at least
from a job-mobility perspective), to break the historical employer-based
provision of the system in order to institute reforms to improve access and
control costs.”
We recognize that job-lock is but one aspect in the health care reform
debate. While job-lock alone may be insufficient reason for changing the
current health care delivery system from its current employer-based form, it
is at the same time insufficient basis for an argument against other reform
proposals. We hope that the research presented by Douglas Holtz-Eakin
will, therefore, stimulate discussion and help to identify which issues—be
they related to the labor market or not—are most in need of attention in
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I. Health Insurance and 
the Labor Market 
Access to health care, medical costs, and
health insurance have risen to the top of
the national policy agenda. This attention
reflects  the  increasing  share  of  U.S.
resources devoted to health care expendi-
tures: Between 1950 and 1990, the share
of Net National Product devoted to health
care has risen from 4.8 percent to 13.7 per-
cent.1 Despite the increase in expenditures,
there is widespread concern that the large
number of uninsured families exposes indi-
viduals and their children to health prob-
lems. In the eyes of many, the root of both
problems  may  be  at  least  partially
attributed to the U.S. tradition of provid-
ing health insurance with other job-related
benefits.
Aaron (1991) reports that two out of every
three Americans under the age of 65 are
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ees. Government policy has fostered this reliance on employer-provided
insurance through the exclusion of premiums from taxable income
under the U.S. individual income tax. These deductions have a value of
nearly $80 billion and provide a clear incentive to add health insurance
as a fringe benefit.2,3 At the same time, premium deductibility provides
little incentive for individuals to reduce insurance costs or to efficiently
utilize medical services. For these reasons, many diagnoses of the health
care cost spiral center on the incentives provided by the U.S. system of
employer-based insurance plans.
Employer-provided insurance may impose an equally large, if hidden,
cost on the economy by interfering with labor market mobility.
Employer-provided insurance typically is not portable. As a result, indi-
viduals who choose to leave their employers usually must change their
health insurance. In the process, they may face being temporarily unin-
sured, paying a higher price for the same coverage, or losing all or part
of their insurance coverage (due, for example, to a preexisting condi-
tion). In response to these risks, individuals may feel compelled to sacri-
fice job opportunities; if so, they are “locked” in their jobs as a result
of nonportable health insurance.
Increased attention has been paid to the issue of insurance-related “job-
lock” due to recent survey evidence.  In 1991, a CBS/New York Times
survey indicated that roughly 30 percent of respondents had stayed in
jobs to retain their current health insurance coverage.4 The Wall Street
J o u r n a l recently reported a similar, if somewhat smaller finding—
namely that in 1992, 12 percent of respondents had “passed up job
opportunities because of considerations involving health insurance ben-
efits.”5
Such survey evidence raises the specter of a labor market lacking the
flexibility to respond to changing economic conditions. To the extent
that this scenario is true, the U.S. pays a cost in the form of reduced
productivity from 
• workers ill-suited to their current employers
• a misallocation of its labor force 
Job-Lock: An Impediment to Labor Mobility?
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stayed too long in their jobs
In a similar fashion, job-lock may be an impediment to entrepreneur-
ship. Entrepreneurial enterprises are widely recognized as an important
source of innovation, employment, and economic dynamism. Start-up
ventures create jobs and provide new competition to existing busi-
nesses, thereby helping to improve product quality and the supply of
new goods and services. The absence of portable health insurance,
however, may affect a worker’s decision to leave a job and start a new
firm. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal noted, “If you’re thinking of tak-
ing the entrepreneurial plunge, take a break from the business plans
and five-year projections and consider your family’s need for health,
disability, and life insurance.”6
II. Job-Lock and Its Costs
The emergence of health insurance as a reoccurring theme in policy dis-
cussions concerning the labor market raises important questions about
issues relating to the nature and size of the distortions induced by our
national system of health insurance.
Firms competing in labor markets hire those workers whose productiv-
ity is high enough to offset the cost of their compensation. For example,
if a firm offers $20,000 in wages and $5,000 in health insurance it will
profit from hiring any worker whose productivity exceeds $25,000. 
On the other side of the labor market, workers analyze offers, implicitly
weighing the relative value of wages and salary versus benefits such as
medical insurance. Some workers may value health insurance highly,
perhaps even more than the purchase price of $5,000. Other workers
(those with little demand for health insurance) may value medical bene-
fits at less than $5,000, and, therefore, value the total package offered
by the firm at less than $25,000. For example, if the latter workers
value health insurance at only $0.80 per dollar of benefits provided, the
effective value of the firm’s total compensation is $24,000. Such work-
ers would prefer a firm offering more compensation in the form of
salary and less in medical benefits: $22,000 in salary and $3,000 in
Is Health Insurance Crippling the Labor Market?
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pensation of $24,400 to such employees.7 As workers choose among
their options and firms adjust their compensation packages, employees
in the economy will be distributed among the productive opportunities
in industries and firms.
There are two important features to this process. First, for each firm in
the example, total compensation per worker is $25,000. Those who are
hired return at least this amount of productivity to the firms. From this
perspective, workers are interchangeable: Equally productive workers
are equally costly to the firm. The second key aspect is that in the
worker’s view, firms are not interchangeable. Workers who place a very
high value on health insurance (and other benefits) will be attracted to
firms that offer even small amounts of these benefits. However, because
the amount of insurance compensation offered by any one firm tends to
be equal for each employee, firms must increase the level of benefits
they extend in order to attract workers who place a lower value on
health insurance (that is, to offset the lower valuation placed on bene-
fits by these workers). As firms compete for workers, both the amount
of health insurance and its implicit value in the market will be deter-
mined by these lower-valuation workers. This process generates a sur-
plus for high-valuation employees as they receive a higher level of insur-
ance and, in doing so, garner benefits the value of which exceeds the
implicit price determined by the labor market.
In the end, otherwise identically productive workers (who are inter-
changeable from the firms’ perspective) will differ in their propensity to
move to new jobs. Any implicit surplus provided by health insurance
will act as a “wedge” between a worker’s current compensation and the
value of offers elsewhere (which are determined by lower-valuation
individuals). The greater the value placed on health insurance the larger
the wedge and, hence, the greater the outside offer needed to induce a
worker to change jobs.8 New employment offers arise when a worker’s
productivity is higher in another job; from the perspective of the econ-
omy as a whole it is desirable for the individual to choose his or her
most productive opportunity. Because of differences in the valuation of
health insurance, however, individuals may not pursue these opportuni-
ties but, rather, may be locked into activities in which their productivity
is lower.
Job-Lock: An Impediment to Labor Mobility?
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individual’s productivity in the two jobs, which represents the foregone
opportunity to raise the amount of economic output through a more
efficient utilization of labor and its skills. The longer the mismatch per-
sists over time, the greater the costs.
In extreme cases, individuals may fear losing their health insurance—
either in part or entirely—when changing jobs. By definition, this pro-
duces large differences between the value of compensation in their cur-
rent jobs versus employment elsewhere. The practice of medical
underwriting—which requires individuals to pass a physical examina-
tion in order to qualify for coverage—may increase the risk of an indi-
vidual losing insurance when he or she changes jobs. This feature looms
largest for those who have experienced a significant decline in their
health and may further hinder job mobility.
Even if not denied coverage, a second feature of the insurance market
may raise impediments to job mobility. As part of his or her current
group plan, a worker may be relatively inexpensive to insure. The cost
of insurance to small firms, however, may be experience-rated (that is,
based on the number of, or growth in, recently submitted claims). This
makes a new employee (especially one who has experienced a decline in
his or her health) more costly to insure in a new job at a small firm, and
results in the individual being a less attractive candidate for such jobs.
From the perspective of the individual, the higher premium reduces the
net benefit from insurance. In either example, the net value of health
insurance benefits may drop sharply (even to zero) as an individual
changes jobs.
Cooper and Monheit (forthcoming) report that “among job changers,
only two-thirds of the 4.7 million wage earners who held employment-
related insurance at their first 1987 jobs obtained such coverage at their
new jobs, while over one-fifth of such policyholders became unin-
sured.”  Because many firms impose waiting periods before providing
health insurance, Cooper and Monheit recognize that their computa-
tion will overstate permanent insurance losses.9 Nevertheless, the risk
of at least a temporary loss of coverage appears to be significant.
Is Health Insurance Crippling the Labor Market?
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cluding coverage for preexisting conditions. A 1987 survey indicated
that 57 percent of employers had clauses in their insurance arrange-
ments that limited or excluded coverage for expenses stemming from
preexisting conditions. For smaller firms such caveats were even more
prevalent: 64 percent of employers in small firms (those with fewer
than 500 employees) had policies that included such a clause.10
In sum, it is not difficult to envision the role health insurance might
play in reducing labor market mobility. Notice, too, that differences
among individuals in the valuation of health insurance are at the heart
of job-lock. The degree to which individuals differ in their assessments
of health benefits (which, in turn, determines the relative extent of job-
lock) is ultimately an empirical issue. Employment decisions are, of
course, affected by a multitude of other considerations. Job-lock result-
ing from health insurance factors may, then, be dominated by other
considerations.
Moreover, economic incentives can be used to circumvent job-lock. To
the extent that firms have the flexibility to alter the mix of wages and
benefits on an employee-by-employee basis, it is possible to tailor com-
pensation to attract individual workers. A firm could compensate indi-
viduals with more expensive insurance (for example, by covering preex-
isting conditions) at the expense of wages, thereby overcoming
proclivities toward job-lock.
In the end, job-lock is like most economic policy issues: It is possible to
envision circumstances in which a problem will arise and obtain survey
evidence that suggests that individuals may be subject to these forces.
The severity and/or general incidence of the phenomenon, however, is
often unknown. Only empirical research may reveal the extent of its
economic effect.
III. Job-Lock: How Big?
Do people get locked into their jobs by health insurance?  Figure 1 pro-
vides a comparison of job-mobility behavior between 1984 and 1985
for individuals with and without employer-provided health insurance.11
Job-Lock: An Impediment to Labor Mobility?
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Health Insurance and the Propensity to Change Jobs* 
(A) ALL INDIVIDUALS
No Job Change Job Change
No Insurance Plan 2,078 588
0.78 0.22
Insurance Plan 2,880 515
0.85 0.15
(B) MARRIED MEN
No Job Change Job Change
No Insurance Plan 810 174
0.82 0.18
Insurance Plan 1,500 221
0.87 0.13
(C) MARRIED WOMEN
No Job Change Job Change
No Insurance Plan 665 213
0.76 0.24
Insurance Plan 771 148
0.84 0.16
(D) SINGLE MEN
No Job Change Job Change
No Insurance Plan 222 96
0.70 0.30
Insurance Plan 244 69
0.74 0.26
(E) SINGLE WOMEN
No Job Change Job Change
No Insurance Plan 381 105
0.79 0.22
Insurance Plan 365 77
0.83 0.17
*Each cell shows the number of entries in the cell (top) and the proportion of the
entries in each row that are in the cell (bottom).
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the number of individuals who fall into that cell, while the bottom
number displays the fraction of people in that row who fall into the
cell. For example, consider panel (A), which summarizes the entire sam-
ple: Its first cell indicates that of the 2,666 people who did not have
employer-provided insurance, 2,078 individuals, or 78 percent, did not
change their jobs during the survey period. In contrast, the upper-right
cell in the panel shows that the remaining 588 individuals without an
employer plan, or 22 percent, did change jobs between 1984 and 1985.
What message is conveyed by the data in panel (A)?  The notion of job-
lock predicts that those with employer-provided insurance will not
change jobs, while those without insurance will switch employment;
entries, therefore, should be clustered in the upper-right and lower-left
cells. The data in panel (A) indicate that the propensity to change jobs
is much higher for those without insurance (22 percent) than for those
with insurance (15 percent). 
Is job-lock a phenomenon restricted to certain workers?  The remaining
panels in Figure 1 display the relationship between insurance and job
mobility for men and women by marital status. In each case, the per-
centage of those who change jobs is lower among those with insurance
than among those who are not provided health insurance by their
employers.12
Figure 1 provides a relatively crude examination of job-lock because it
ignores other factors that may be associated with changing jobs. In
their study of job-lock, Cooper and Monheit (forthcoming) utilize a
more sophisticated incarnation of the strategy employed here.
Specifically, they use the National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES)
to compare job mobility between those with and those without
employer-provided insurance while controlling for a wide array of eco-
nomic and demographic characteristics of the individuals included in
the sample. They conclude that for married males, the decline in mobil-
ity is as much as 25 percent. 
There is an important pitfall to using this approach, however. In doing
a statistical analysis, even comprehensive data sets do not include the
enormous array of information needed to fully describe an individual’s
Job-Lock: An Impediment to Labor Mobility?
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likely acting as a proxy for a wide variety of desirable, but unobserved,
characteristics of a job. That is, “good jobs” provide a package of
desirable characteristics including health insurance (which appears in
the data) and other characteristics (which do not). Hence, the fact that
workers are less likely to leave jobs that provide health insurance bene-
fits may tell us nothing more than that people are less likely to leave
“good jobs.”
To deal with this problem, Holtz-Eakin (forthcoming) and Madrian
(1992) examined the behavior of married individuals who had
employer insurance, and compared job mobility of those whose spouses
had insurance to those whose spouses did not have coverage. The logic
of the test is straightforward: If job-lock is important, an individual
whose spouse has health benefits effectively receives “portable insur-
ance” via the spouse’s plan; the job mobility of such an individual,
therefore, should be unaffected by the loss of his or her own insurance
plan. In contrast, individuals whose spouses do not have insurance will
find themselves locked into their jobs.
Figure 2 displays the findings based on this strategy using a format
analogous to the type used to derive the statistics shown in Figure 1. As
panel (A) shows, 13 percent of individuals whose spouses did not have
insurance did change jobs. Consistent with the notion of job-lock, the
15 percent mobility rate recorded among those whose spouses had
insurance is higher than the mobility rate among those who did not
have insurance, although the difference is quite small. Indeed, a statisti-
cal test indicates that the rates are indistinguishable. Thus, a more
refined technique provides no support for the job-lock hypothesis.
Just as having insurance may be a reflection of holding a good job, a
spouse with insurance may reflect a “good spouse,” that is, one with
skills sufficient to be employed in a job that provides insurance.
Moreover, simply being married to a skilled spouse may make it easier
for an individual to change jobs, as there is less risk involved than when
the spouse does not have health insurance and/or good labor market
skills. If the risk associated with job mobility is inversely related to the
extent of a spouse’s market skills, the difference in job mobility in
Figure 2 reflects both the effects of health insurance and the effects of
Is Health Insurance Crippling the Labor Market?
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Spouse Insurance and the Propensity to 
Change Jobs Among the Insured*
(A) ALL INDIVIDUALS
No Job Change Job Change
No Spouse Insurance 1,267 191
0.87 0.13
Spouse Insurance Plan 1,004 178
0.85 0.15
(B) MARRIED MEN
No Job Change Job Change
No Spouse Insurance 1,002 133
0.88 0.12
Spouse Insurance Plan 498 88
0.85 0.15
(C) MARRIED WOMEN
No Job Change Job Change
No Spouse Insurance  265 58
0.82 0.18
Spouse Insurance Plan 506 90
0.84 0.16
*See the note to Figure 1.
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valuable even if the individual is not job-locked, it is possible to disen-
tangle the effect of the spouse’s skills from that of the insurance, per se.
To do so, we first must examine individuals who do not have insurance
and, thus, do not have a job-lock problem for their spouses’ insurance
to “solve.”  Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the
mobility rate for uninsured individuals whose spouses have insurance is
5 percentage points higher than the mobility rates for uninsured indi-
viduals whose spouses do not have insurance. This is the effect of the
spouse’s skills alone. As shown in Figure 2, the difference in mobility
rates for insured individuals is 2 (that is, 15 minus 13) percentage
points. As noted earlier, this reflects both the effect of the spouse and
the value of having portable insurance. Subtracting the spouse effect (5
points) from the combined effect (2 points) gives an estimate of the
lock-in effect equal to negative 3 percentage points. (Because it uses a
comparison of differences in mobility rates to identify lock-in, this
approach is known as differences-in-differences.1 3) The choice of
method, however, does not alter the outcome: Job-lock does not appear
to be an important empirical issue. The extent to which mobility rates
are higher for individuals whose spouses are insured apparently is
attributable to the spouses’ market skills. There is no residual job-lock
effect in the data.
Because the labor force behavior of married men may be quite different
from that of married women, there may be concern that the pattern
noted above could be contaminated as the result of pooling these two
groups together. However, panels (B) and (C) in Figure 2 indicate that
when the two groups are examined separately, the difference in mobil-
ity rates between them is quite small. For men, mobility is higher if the
spouse is insured, but the difference is not significant. For women, the
mobility difference is negative, indicating that the result goes the
“wrong” way from a job-lock perspective.14
Again, the results stated thus far may not fully capture the more com-
plex story behind actions in the labor market. As noted earlier, both
Holtz-Eakin (forthcoming) and Madrian (1992) embed the logic of the
test in Figure 2 within comprehensive studies of job mobility. Madrian
focuses on the behavior of married men aged 25 to 55 included in the
NMES and finds, at best, weak evidence of job-lock, while Holtz-Eakin
Is Health Insurance Crippling the Labor Market?
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marital status or gender.
Using information about the insurance status of spouses to isolate the
occurrence of job-lock is an improvement over simple comparisons of
the insured to the uninsured. It is not, however, without potential pit-
falls. Spouses are likely to make jointly both insurance and labor mar-
ket decisions; thus, differences in the insurance status of spouses are
unlikely to be independent of employment decisions. In short, there is
some risk that causation could run from job mobility to spouses’ insur-
ance and not the reverse.
It is straightforward, however, to extend the logic of the spouse insur-
ance test. The key precept of the test is that individuals place different
values on their insurance—and, hence, their cost of changing jobs—if
they have access to other insurance. There are, however, added reasons
that one might place a high value on insurance. Individuals in poor
health, for example, are likely to place a higher value on their insurance
than those in good health.
Keeping this in mind, consider the data in Figure 3. The first row shows
the occurrence of job-lock among married men with employer-provided
insurance. Column (a) shows that 7.3 percent of married men who
reported themselves as being in poor health and whose spouses had
insurance changed jobs. In contrast, 9.6 percent of married men in simi-
larly poor health whose spouses were not insured changed jobs (refer to
column (b)). Labor mobility was 2.3 percentage points l o w e r for the
insured-spouse group than for the uninsured-spouse group (see column
(e)). To see if the effect was larger for those in poor health, the same
comparisons must be made for individuals in good health; these are
shown in columns (c) and (d). As shown in column (f), for those in
good health, the simple difference in mobility was 3.7 percentage points
higher for the insured-spouse group. 
Finally, the net job-lock effect is derived by comparing the differences-
in-differences between the “poor health” and “good health” groups;
this is provided in column (g). Again, we observe a negative “job-lock”
effect of 6 percentage points, which indicates that insurance is less
important for those in poor health. That is, spousal health insurance is 
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those in poor health. In light of this, it is difficult to conclude from the
data that job mobility among married men is affected by employer-pro-
vided health insurance.
Poor health is not the only (and may not be the best) indicator for plac-
ing a high value on health insurance. In the face of medical underwrit-
ing and preexisting condition clauses, individuals whose health has
recently worsened may place a higher value on their existing insurance
arrangements than those who have remained healthy. For example, a
KPMG Peat Marwick survey cited in the Wall Street Journal indicated
that the absence of coverage for preexisting conditions—a situation that
affects over two-thirds of employees—may be an impediment to work-
ers’ switching jobs.15 Thus, a decline in health status may have impor-
tant implications for job mobility. (The second row of Figure 3 pro-
vides job-lock computations for individuals who reported a decline in
health status during the previous two years.)
Alternatively, one might prefer more objective measures of health care
needs, such as (1) individuals who have lost 100 or more hours of work
due to their own or others’ illness, (2) those who spent four or more
days in a hospital, or (3) those with young children (aged two years old
and less). (Computations (analogous to those discussed above) showing
the incidence of job-lock are shown for each of these indicators in the
final three rows of Figure 3.)
What sort of statistical picture do these investigations reveal?  With the
sole exception of the results for “Worse Health” (Figure 3, row 2), the
estimated incidence of job-lock among married men is either in the
wrong direction or of inconsequential size.16 (A similar pattern arises
in groups distinguished by gender and marital status, with a greater
importance apparent only among those who categorize themselves as
being in poor health. Refer to Appendix Figures 1–3.)  Moreover, the
results in Holtz-Eakin (forthcoming) suggest that even these weak
effects overstate the effect of job-lock. In sum, even when a wide variety
of methods is used to isolate the determinants of job-lock, little system-
atic evidence is found that health insurance interferes with job mobility.
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The statistical findings reviewed in the previous section contradict sur-
vey and anecdotal evidence indicating that individuals tend to value
their current insurance arrangements so highly that they forgo other-
wise attractive new jobs. Can this apparent contradiction be resolved?
One possibility is that such evidence reflects job-lock experienced only
by specific subgroups of the labor force; the effects of job-lock on these
groups, therefore, could be masked by data aggregation. Several possi-
bilities for such groups come to mind, such as low-wage individuals
who would find out-of-pocket medical expenses especially onerous,
older workers who might have the greatest risk of loss of insurance as
the result of medical underwriting, and short-tenure workers whose
employment record might make it more difficult to attract a job with
insurance benefits.
To check these possibilities, the data in the PSID were divided between
men and women who, in 1984, made more than $8,000 in wages (and
those who made less), those who were older than 50 (and those
younger than 50), and those who had more than 3 years of tenure on
the job (and those with fewer than 3 years of experience).
The same technique as that used in Figure 3 was used to assess the
importance of job-lock for the newly defined sample. In only one
instance was there a consistent pattern of job-lock, namely among men
and women with relatively short job tenures.17 In short, the data pro-
vide some evidence that concern about the loss of insurance may be
important for individuals who have had a relatively short job history
with their current employers. However, the results were at best, sugges-
tive.
V. Job-Lock and Entrepreneurs
As noted at the outset, there is some concern that employment-based
insurance acts as an impediment to aspiring entrepreneurs. Indeed, one
might expect the effect to be even more dramatic in this context as the
loss of insurance is a necessary consequence of starting a new venture.
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preneurs?  
Using the method employed above, spouses’ insurance can be used to
investigate job-lock effects on entrepreneurs. Specifically, we can com-
pare the propensity to become self-employed among insured individuals
whose spouses have insurance to that of individuals whose spouses do
not have health coverage. Doing so, however, indicates essentially no
difference between the groups in their proclivity to become entre-
preneurs.18
As before, there is reason for concern with this approach. One explana-
tion for a spouse to choose to have insurance is the possibility of an
individual becoming self-employed. It then appears worthwhile to pur-
sue other means of gauging job-lock for aspiring entrepreneurs.
Attempts to do so are displayed in Figure 4, which uses the indicators
of highly valued health insurance (used in Figure 3) to identify job-lock.
As before, the basic method is to compare the difference in the rate of
entrepreneurship among those with insurance to those without insur-
ance, and then to examine whether this difference is greater for individ-
uals who place a high value on health benefits. Despite one intriguing
result (specifically, the job-lock estimate using poor health as an indica-
tor of demand for health insurance), the outcome follows a similar
trend to those discussed above, namely that there is little systematic evi-
dence that the presence or lack of health insurance produces job-lock
among aspiring entrepreneurs.19
VI. Lessons for Policy Reform
A review of the empirical evidence indicates that, despite concerns to
the contrary, health insurance considerations do not appear to be a per-
vasive roadblock to job mobility in the U.S. labor market. This fact is
an important consideration in the debate over reform of the health
insurance system. To date, anecdotal evidence has overly emphasized
the importance of job-lock and led to undue emphasis on the creation
of an insurance system independent of employers (see, for example,
Mitchell (1990)). Instead, the absence of widespread job-lock should
ease concern about the employment-based structure of the U.S. health
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perspective), to break the historical employer-based provision of the
system in order to institute reforms to improve access and control costs.
An even larger implication is that a system mandating the provision of
health insurance by employers is unlikely to have large, adverse conse-
quences for labor mobility.20
More generally, the evidence suggests that reform of the health insur-
ance system in the United States should not be tailored to minimize the
effects on labor mobility, as these effects are small and likely restricted
to a few special subgroups of the labor market. Instead, reform should
be judged on how it improves (1) access to care and (2) the efficiency of
providing insurance.
Not all employer-provided systems are equal, however. In Germany,
which has been presented by some as a model for any U.S. reform, vir-
tually all citizens are guaranteed health insurance as part of a privately
operated, compulsory health insurance system. Although insurance is
provided by employers, the mandatory aspect of the system has the
effect of insuring portability. One feature of the German system, how-
ever, is that individuals may pay different—sometimes very different—
premiums for essentially the same coverage, with the cost of that cover-
age a function of which insurance company (sickness fund) is chosen by
the employer. Thus, while health coverage may be portable, the price is
not, which leads to a situation analogous to job-lock.21
The lesson for the United States is that it is not enough to ensure that
all employers provide health insurance. While the evidence suggests that
it is safe to link insurance coverage to one’s employer, the price of such
coverage should not be a function of an employer’s type or size of firm.
Reform proposals that attempt to impose differential costs for insur-
ance between, for example, large and small employers are likely to gen-
erate perverse labor market incentives. More generally, reforms should
be devoted to linking the price of insurance to the costs faced by insur-
ers and not to the characteristics of employment.
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About the Data
The data in this study are drawn from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). Since 1968, the PSID has annually interviewed a rep-
resentative sample of approximately 5,000 families. At least one mem-
ber of each family was either a member of one of the families originally
interviewed in 1968, or born to a member of one of these families (for a
complete discussion, see Survey Research Center (1984)). The PSID
offers many advantages, in particular a wealth of longitudinal data on
labor market performance.
In 1984, individuals surveyed under the PSID were asked:
“Does your employer pay for any medical, surgical, or
hospital insurance that covers any illness or injury that
might happen to you when you are not at work?”
For married couples, spouses were asked an identical question regard-
ing the payment of health insurance by their employers. Those individu-
als who answered “yes” were classified as having employer-provided
health insurance. The largest drawback was that the data contained no
information about the extent or cost of coverage, especially the degree
to which spouses were covered by any plan. Also, the information was
collected for only a single year. However, even the relatively circum-
scribed information on health insurance coverage may provide useful
insights about the job-lock hypothesis.
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1. Aaron (1991), Table 3-1. While the U.S. experience is slightly more extreme,
most countries have experienced an increase in the share of output devoted to
health expenditures. See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office (1992b), p. 3.
2. Calculations derived from data included in Congressional Budget Office (1992a),
p. 258. Taxing employer-paid insurance would generate $230 billion in income
tax revenues and $160 billion in payroll tax revenues over the five-year period of
1993–1997. The number in the text was derived by converting the total ($390
billion) into an annual average.
3. For a discussion of the relationship between tax policy and the provision of
fringe benefits, see Sloan and Adamache (1986) or Hamermesh and Woodbury
(1990).
4. T h e New York Times, September 26, 1991, page 1. The question asked was:
“Have you or anyone else in your household ever decided to stay in a job you
wanted to leave mainly because you didn’t want to lose health coverage?”
5. Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1993, page A1.
6. Asinof (1992), p. C1.
7. This discussion ignores the effect of income and payroll taxes, which reduce the
value of $1 of wages. Adding taxes would complicate the arithmetic, but would
not alter the basic logic of the argument.
8. Gruber and Madrian (1993) detail the relationship between workers’ valuation
of health insurance benefits—indeed any job-specific amenity—and job-lock.
9. Madrian (1992) reports that length-of-service restrictions imposed prior to
receiving insurance apply to slightly less than 50 percent of full-time workers
who are employed by firms of 250 or more employees.
10. The survey—composed of 2,000 employers offering health insurance—was con-
ducted by Foster Higgens, an employee benefits consulting firm (see Cotton
(1991)).
11. The figures in this paper were derived from data in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). See the Appendix for a description of the data.
12. It is possible to conduct a statistical test of whether the differences in measured
job mobility rates reflect differences in underlying job-changing behavior, or are
simply a reflection of the particular sample of individuals surveyed. Conducting
such a test yields that, with the exception of single women, the differences in job-
mobility rates shown in Figure 1 are all statistically significant.
13. For a discussion, see Madrian (1992).
14. Analogous results were obtained when the differences-in-differences approach
was employed.
15. Wall Street Journal, December 31, 1991, p. A1.
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PPB No.10  2/16/99  2:13 PM  Page 3116. In no case are the results statistically different from a zero effect.
17. Note, however, that when a multivariate statistical analysis was employed,
Holtz-Eakin (forthcoming) found that job-lock was not related to tenure.
Madrian (1992) did not have information on tenure; it, therefore, is tempting to
speculate that the slightly stronger job-lock effect found there stems from the
inability to control for tenure.
18. The difference in the rates is 0.5 percentage points. Using the differences-in-dif-
ferences approach, the job-lock effect falls to 0.2 percentage points. Neither esti-
mate is statistically different from zero.
19. Preliminary results based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation
and the PSID indicate that health insurance has little effect on the supply of
entrepreneurs. See Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, and Rosen (1993).
20. This does not imply that the costs of such a system would not affect overall
employment. O’Neill and O’Neill (1993) estimate that mandating health insur-
ance would raise overall labor costs by 3.8 percent and reduce aggregate employ-
ment by 3.1 million employees.
21. See Holtz-Eakin (forthcoming).
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